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ABOLISHING AUSTRALIA’S JUDICIALLY ENACTED SUI GENERIS 
DOCTRINE OF EXTENDED JOINT ENTERPRISE 
Victoria B. Wang* 
This Article argues that the decision in Miller v The Queen [2016] 
HCA 30 is supported neither by common law precedent in Australia nor the 
historical English precedents that informed the development of Australia’s 
common law doctrines. It is submitted that the majority judgment misquoted 
old English authorities to try to equate foresight with intention and argues 
that the High Court of Australia engaged in judicial activism, because its 
decision rested predominantly on the policy views of the judges. Moreover, 
it is argued that the case highlighted the urgent need for law reform in 
Australia. The Article puts forward a theory to demonstrate that treating a 
person who did not perpetrate the collateral crime or assist or encourage its 
commission the same as the perpetrator of that collateral crime is unfair 
and unjust. Therefore, this Article argues that the extended joint enterprise 
doctrine created in Miller should be rejected in the 21st century. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 The doctrine of “extended joint enterprise” was enacted by judicial fiat 
in Australia in 1995 in the case of McAuliffe v The Queen.1 It appears the 
judges deciding McAuliffe v The Queen were confounded by Chan Wing-Siu 
v The Queen—a 1985 decision of the Privy Council.2  Their confusion about 
what Sir Robin Cooke was expounding in Chan Wing-Siu led them to create 
a new doctrine of complicity liability. The doctrine of extended joint 
enterprise complicity has no doctrinal lineage in the common law in 
Australia before 1995.3 There were factual situations involving a common 
purpose over the underlying crime, and then there was a collateral crime, but 
these cases, when examined closely, prove to be straightforward cases of 
intentional encouragement. 4  On the facts as presented in the earlier 
precedents, there was ample evidence for a jury to infer that, by joining the 
underlying criminal enterprise, the accessory sent a message of 
encouragement to the perpetrator in relation to the collateral crime. 
Moreover, in these cases, there was ample evidence to infer that the 
encouragement was intended to encourage the perpetrator to commit the 
anticipated collateral crime. 
A similar error was made in R v Powell,5 but the Supreme Court of 
the United Kingdom (The Supreme Court) and Privy Council corrected that 
                                                        
1 [1995] 183 ALJR 621, ¶ 19 (Austl.). It is also acknowledged by the majority in Miller 
v The Queen that the doctrine’s doctrinal foundations cannot be traced beyond the 
1980s when they stated: 
These criticisms were invoked in support of an application to re-
open and overrule McAuliffe in Clayton v The Queen. By 
majority, the Court declined to do so. Among the majority’s 
reasons for that refusal was the observation that principles 
consistent with McAuliffe form part of the common law in other 
countries. These principles are commonly traced to the decision 
of the Privy Council in Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen. 
Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30, ¶ 2 (Austl.) (citations omitted). The majority goes 
on to say, “McAuliffe builds on the principles enunciated in Johns.” Id. at ¶ 37. 
2 Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen [1985] AC 168 (U.K.). 
3 The earlier cases required intention and factual encouragement. The encouragement 
was inferred by the fact that the accessory intentionally joined the joint enterprise, 
intending his act of joining to send a message of encouragement to the perpetrator of 
the anticipated collateral crime. DENNIS J. BAKER, REINTERPRETING CRIMINAL  
COMPLICITY AND INCHOATE PARTICIPATION OFFENCES 48–49 (2016). 
4 Id. at 46–141. 
5 R v Powell [1999] 1 AC 1 (HL) (U.K.). 
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error in 2016. In R v Jogee6 and Ruddock v The Queen,7 the Supreme Court 
of the United Kingdom and the Board of the Privy Council overruled R v 
Powell and Chan Wing-Siu to bring the law back into line with the common 
law as it stood for centuries prior to Chan Wing-Siu. The High Court of 
Australia (The High Court) refused to follow suit and gave some doubtful 
policy reasons to justify retaining the doctrine of extended joint enterprise 
that The High Court minted in 1995.8 
The main theory the High Court in Miller v The Queen used to 
justify extended joint enterprise liability was the “change of normative 
position” theory. 9  According to this theory, a person has changed his 
normative position by taking part in a criminal enterprise to commit an 
underlying crime and should, therefore, take responsibility for any collateral 
crimes following from that enterprise. 10  The High Court also relied on 
                                                        
6 R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 (U.K.). 
7 Ruddock v The Queen [2016] UKPC 7 (U.K.). 
8 There is a similar doctrine in the United States that is comparable to the extended joint 
enterprise doctrine in Australia—among other common law countries—namely the natural 
probable consequence rule. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-303(A)(3) (West 2008); IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 703.2 (West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3205(2) (West 2007); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. Tit. 17-A, § 57(3)(A) (West 2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.05(2) (West 2017); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.05(2)(c) (West 2017); State v. Jefferson, 574 N.W.2d 268 (Iowa 
1997); State v. Edwards, 498 P.2d 48 (Kan. 1972); State v. Filippi, 335 N.W.2d 739 (Minn. 
1983); John F. Decker, The Mental State Requirement for Accomplice Liability in American 
Criminal Law, 60 S.C. L. REV. 237 (2008). According to this rule, a participant in a criminal 
joint enterprise should be liable as an accessory, not only for the underlying crime, but also 
for any incidental crime committed by his confederate if it was a reasonably foreseeable 
consequence of committing the underlying crime. This rule is even stricter than the extended 
joint enterprise doctrine in that it makes the defendant liable for any reasonably foreseeable 
consequence of the underlying crime, even if the defendant himself did not subjectively 
foresee it. Although, the Model Penal Code rejected this rule, it still has fairly wide 
application in many states as well as in federal courts. See Model Penal Code § 2.06 (West 
2016); see also Brewner v. State, 804 S.E.2d 94 (Ga. 2017); United States v. Wills, 88 F.3d 
704 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Miller, 22 F.3d 1075 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Vaden, 912 F.2d 780 (5th Cir. 1990); State v. Filippi, 335 N.W.2d 739 (Minn. 1983); State 
v. Edwards, 498 P.2d 48 (Kan. 1972); Michael G. Heyman, The Natural Probable 
Consequence Doctrine: A Case Study in Failed Law Reform, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 388, 
395 (2010). In a recent case, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the mens rea 
element of complicity liability requires both that the accomplice intentionally provided 
assistance or encouragement and that the accomplice intended the full scope of the crime to 
be committed. Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1248 (2014). It is not clear 
whether this case has the effect of abrogating the natural probable consequence rule or not.   
9 Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30, ¶ 123 (Austl.). 
10 Jeremy Horder & David Hughes, Joint Criminal Ventures and Murder: The  
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policy considerations to justify extended joint enterprise liability.11 It held 
that criminal enterprises posed greater threats to society than individual 
criminals and that the extended joint enterprise doctrine was necessary to 
protect the public against criminal gangs. 12  However, none of these 
justifications were solid and convincing enough to justify extended joint 
enterprise liability. This Article shows the unfairness and injustice of the 
doctrine of extended joint enterprise and the doctrinal and normative 
grounds on which it should be rejected. 
In Part II, the Article briefly examines the common law principles of 
complicity liability, which requires intention and actual assistance or 
encouragement. The Article shows that precedents in English common law 
required intention rather than foresight in complicity liability and that Miller 
misquoted old English authorities. It argues that neither the theoretical nor 
policy considerations in Miller can provide convincing justifications for 
extended joint enterprise doctrine. The Article argues that the policy 
reasons13 to promote deterrence are not empirically improved and that they 
cannot override basic criminal law principles, such as fair labelling and 
proportionate punishment. 
The moral foundations of complicity have been said to rest on 
culpable, indirect causation.14  But it will be argued in Part III that this 
assertion is not true. This Article argues that assisting or encouraging a 
perpetrator is a remote harm because its harmfulness is contingent on the 
autonomous, free, and informed choice of the perpetrator to commit the 
target crime.15 Therefore, treating an assister or encourager the same way as 
a perpetrator is unfair and unjust, because the former is less harmful and less 
dangerous than the latter. This Article then argues in Part IV that treating the 
actual perpetrator of a collateral crime the same as a person who did not 
                                                                                                                                      
Prospects for Law Reform, 20 KING’S L. J. 379, 398 (2009); A.P. Simester, The Mental 
Element in Complicity, 122 LAW Q. REV. 578, 598–99 (2006). 
11 Miller, HCA 30 at ¶ 34–35. 
12 Id. at ¶¶ 36, 146. 
13 Id. at ¶ 101; R v Powell [1999] 1 AC 1 (HL) (U.K.); see Heyman, supra note 8, at 
401; see also Michael Heyman, Losing All Sense of Just Proportion: The Peculiar Law 
of Accomplice Liability, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 129, 152 (2014). 
14 SANFORD H. KADISH, BLAME AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 162 
(1987); John Gardner, Moore on Complicity and Causality, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 432, 436 (2008); Michael S. Moore, Causing, Aiding, and the  
Superfluity of Accomplice Liability, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 407 (2007). 
15 Glanville Williams, Finis for Novus Actus?, 48 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 391, 392 (1989). 
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assist or encourage the collateral crime, but merely foresaw it as a 
possibility in executing the joint enterprise to do an underlying crime, makes 
even less sense. It is proposed that such an extremely unfair and unjust 
doctrine should be rejected. Part V concludes that The High Court’s 
decision in Miller was unsupported and, therefore, should be overturned. 
I. COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES OF COMPLICITY AND THE DOCTRINE OF 
EXTENDED JOINT ENTERPRISE IN AUSTRALIAN LAW 
 The current debate concerns the mental element in complicity and 
whether the element should be limited to intention or should also include 
recklessness. The current law in England, Wales,16 and most states in the 
United States17 requires intention and does not include recklessness as an 
alternative fault element. In those jurisdictions, there must be an intentional 
act of encouragement or assistance, and that act must be done with the 
ulterior intention of assisting or encouraging the perpetrator to commit the 
anticipated target crime. The defendant must intend that the perpetrator act 
with the requisite fault for the anticipated target crime.18 A further constraint 
in those jurisdictions is the conduct element, because actual assistance or 
encouragement is required. 19  Association per se is not sufficient for 
establishing the conduct element.20 This section briefly outlines why Miller 
was wrongly decided. This Article submits that academic research and R v 
Jogee demonstrate that Miller was not only wrongly decided, but was 
grossly unjust. 
A.  Foresight vs. Intention 
The joint majority in Miller held: 
                                                        
16 R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8, ¶ 9 (U.K.). 
17 Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1242 (2014); Giniebra v. State 787 So. 
2d 51, 53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); White v. State, 919 So. 2d 1029, 1033 (Miss. Ct. 
App. 2005); State v. Moreno, 104 P.3d 628, 629 (Or. Ct. App. 2005); Commonwealth 
v. Murphy, 844 A.2d 1228, 1232 (Pa. 2004); Wooden v. State, 101 S.W.3d 542, 546 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2003). 
18 Dennis J. Baker, Reinterpreting the Mental Element in Criminal Complicity: Change 
of Normative Position Theory Cannot Rationalize the Current Law, 40 LAW & 
PSYCHOL. REV. 119, 122 (2016).   
19 Supra note 16–17 and accompanying text. 
20 Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1241; Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 12 (1954); Nye 
v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949). 
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Each party is also guilty of any other crime (“the incidental 
crime”) committed by a co-venturer that is within the scope 
of the agreement (“joint criminal enterprise” liability). . . . 
Moreover, a party to a joint criminal enterprise who foresees, 
but does not agree to, the commission of the incidental crime 
in the course of carrying out the agreement and who, with 
that awareness, continues to participate in the enterprise is 
liable for the incidental offence (“extended joint criminal 
enterprise” liability).21 
Furthermore, the majority went on to say “[t]he wrong in the case of the 
party to the joint criminal enterprise lies in the mutual embarkation on a 
crime with the awareness that the incidental crime may be committed in 
executing their agreement.”22 
 The High Court held that foresight was sufficient to find fault for the 
defendant even when the mens rea for the collateral crime was specific 
intention. 23  The High Court also held that there need not be any 
encouragement or assistance regarding the collateral crime if the accessory 
foresaw that the collateral crime might be perpetrated as an incident of the 
joint enterprise.24 
In the leading United Kingdom complicity case, the Supreme Court 
held that foresight was only evidence of intention and that encouragement or 
assistance was needed to establish the conduct requirement in complicity.25 
In R v Jogee, foresight of possible collateral crimes was used as evidence of 
intention, including conditional intention, in joint enterprise. There was no 
independent doctrine of joint enterprise, because all complicity has the same 
conduct element under Section 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 
1861.26 The conduct element in that Act involves an act of aiding, abetting, 
counselling, or procuring. In modern terminology, these categories have 
been reduced to two categories of acts, which are acts of assistance or acts 
                                                        
21 Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30, ¶ 4 (Austl.). 
22 Id. at ¶ 34; R v Britten [1988] 49 S.A.S.R. 47 (Austl.) (holding that “[t]he judgment, 
delivered by Sir Robin Cooke, discussed the authorities, including Johns v The Queen 
which lay down the well-established principles governing liability of participants in a 
joint criminal enterprise. The judgment gives no indication of any intention to break 
new legal ground or to extend the grounds upon which criminal liability arises in such 
cases”). 
23 Miller, HCA 30 at ¶ 33–36. 
24 Id. 
25 R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8, ¶¶ 8, 11 (U.K.). 
26 Id. at ¶ 4–6. 
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of encouragement. Procurement is a third category, but it only applies in 
unusual innocent agency cases.27 
Prior to the decision in R v Jogee, Baker argued: 
[U]ntil the decision in the House of Lords in R v Powell 
changed law, the foresight of possibility rule (i.e. the 
accessory’s foresight of the collateral crime as a possible 
incident of the underlying joint enterprise), like the probable 
and natural consequences maxim, was a mere maxim of 
evidence for inferring that the common purpose extended to 
the collateral crime …. What was a maxim of evidence has 
been invoked as a substantive fault element in complicity 
since 1999, which has had the effect of extending the mental 
element in common purpose complicity to cover 
recklessness….A crime as a foreseen collateral crime of an 
underlying joint enterprise was merely evidence from which 
an accessory’s intention or conditional intention that the 
perpetrator perpetrates the collateral crime could be inferred. 
28 
In R v Jogee, the Supreme Court held that the law of common 
purpose complicity took a wrong turn since Chan Wing-Siu, 29  equating 
foresight with intention to assist or encourage and therefore treating 
foresight as an inevitable yardstick of common purpose.30 The “maxims of 
evidence such as foresight of probable and possible consequences, not only 
mirror substantive criminal law fault elements, but [also] have been blurred 
with them for centuries.”31 Thus, the substantive fault doctrine in crimes of 
                                                        
27 See Matusevich v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 633, ¶ 3 (Austl.); see also David 
Lanham, Complicity, Concert and Conspiracy, 4 CRIM. L.J. 276, 278–79 (1980). 
28 BAKER, supra note 3, at xxxiv. 
29 Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen [1985] AC 168 (U.K.). 
30 Jogee, UKSC at ¶ 87. There are some other voices contending that Chan Wing-Siu 
did not take a wrong turn and that the Supreme Court’s judgement in Jogee is not 
strongly convincing. See Richard Buxton, Jogee: Upheaval in Secondary Liability for 
Murder, 5 CRIM. L. REV. 324, 328 (2016); A. P. Simester, Accessory Liability and 
Common Unlawful Purposes, 133 LAW Q. REV. 73, 76 (2017); Findlay Stark, The 
Demise of “Parasitic Accessorial Liability”: Substantive Judicial Law Reform, not 
Common Law Housekeeping, 75 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 550 (2016); David Ormerod & Karl 
Laird, Jogee: Not the End of a Legal Saga but the Start of One?, 8 CRIM. L. REV. 539, 
552 (2016). 
31 Dennis J. Baker, Foresight in Common Purpose Complicity/Joint Enterprise  
Complicity: It is a Maxim of Evidence, not a Substantive Fault Element, (manuscript at 
51), https://ssrn.com/abstract= 2507529; Baker, supra note 18, at 243. 
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recklessness is foresight of a possibility or probability that the prohibited 
consequence or conduct might occur. In crimes of negligence, the 
substantive fault element is what a reasonable person would have foreseen 
as the possible or probable consequence or conduct of the given action. A 
reasonable person might foresee that the “conduct” he is assisting will be 
rape, even though the defendant did not intend as much. Added to this mix 
is the maxim that foresight of a virtual certainty can be used to infer that the 
virtual certainty was intended.32 Scholars have also suggested that foresight 
of a virtual certainty can be a substantive fault doctrine for crimes such as 
murder, 33  rather than just an evidential standard 34  for inferring direct 
intention.35 
The High Court of Australia delivered an insightful judgement on 
the law of complicity in 1985, where Chief Justice Gibbs held: 
The very words used in s.351, and the synonyms which 
express their meanings - e.g. help, encourage, advise, 
persuade, induce, bring about by effort - indicate that a 
particular state of mind is essential before a person can 
become liable as a secondary party for the commission of an 
offence, even if the offence is one of strict liability. . . . “It 
will be observed that all these definitions have nothing 
whatever to do with the probability that the forbidden result 
would follow upon the accessory’s conduct; and that they all 
demand that he in some sort associate himself with the 
venture, that he participate in it as in something that he 
wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it 
succeed. All the words used - even the most colourless ‘abet’ 
- carry an implication of purposive attitude towards it.”36 
                                                        
32 R v Woollin [1998] 1 AC 82, 96 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.). 
33 Alan R. White, Intention, Purpose, Foresight and Desire, 92 LAW Q. REV. 569, 570 
(1976); Glanville Williams, Oblique Intention, 46 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 417, 424 (1987). 
34 R v Matthews [2003] 2 Crim. App. 461, 476 (U.K.) (suggesting it is mere evidence 
of direct intention and therefore is not also an alternative substantive fault element for 
murder). 
35 A P SIMESTER ET AL., SIMESTER AND SULLIVAN’S CRIMINAL LAW: THEORY AND 
DOCTRINE 143 (6th ed. 2016); Walter Wheeler Cook, Act, Intention, and Motive in the 
Criminal Law, 26 YALE L.J. 645, 655–56 (1916).   
36 Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473, ¶ 6 (Austl.) (citation omitted). Gibbs 
C.J. uses the term willful blindness to refer to oblique intention, which does make his 
judgment appear somewhat confused. He states:  
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Chief Justice Gibbs held that knowledge can be used to infer 
intention and that oblique intention can be inferred in cases where the 
defendant believed, as a matter of virtual certainty, that a circumstance 
existed and deliberately avoided checking whether it did or would exist.37 
The judgment uses confusing terminology to try to explain that a belief that 
it is virtually certain that a circumstance exists is the same thing as actual 
knowledge, because it used the ambiguous term “wilful blindness.” 38 
Notwithstanding that issue, it is clear that the case does not allow 
recklessness as an alternative substantive fault element in complicity.39 In 
2014, Justice Learned Hand’s interpretation of the law, which persuaded 
Chief Justice Gibbs, was invoked by the Supreme Court of the United 
States40 to support its interpretation of the law as requiring intention, even 
though Peoni41 itself was argued as a natural, probable consequence case. 
The majority in Miller might assert that the decision in Giorgianni v The 
Queen does not apply, since the facts in that case did not involve a joint 
enterprise.42 After all, the High Court held that “extended joint enterprise” is 
a sui generis doctrine. 43  The High Court claims the doctrine started to 
develop in Johns v The Queen,44 but scholars have argued to the contrary 
that Johns supports R v Jogee.45 The majority in R v Jogee also held that 
Johns supported its decision. 46  More importantly, there is a line of 
                                                                                                                                      
Further it is not correct to say that a person may be convicted of 
aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of an 
offence simply because he has acted recklessly . . . Recklessness, in 
the sense of not caring whether the facts exist or not, would be 
relevant only if it too was virtually equivalent to knowledge, in other 
words only if it amounted to wilful blindness. 
Id. at ¶ 15. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at ¶ 17. 
39 Id. at 15. 
40 Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1250 (2014). 
41 “The prosecution's argument is that, as Peoni put the bills in circulation and knew 
that Regno would be likely . . . to sell them to another guilty possessor, the possession 
of the second buyer was a natural consequence of Peoni’s original act, with which he 
might be charged.” United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938). 
42 See Clayton v The Queen [2006] HCA 58, ¶ 102 (Austl.); Gillard v The Queen 
[2003] HCA 64, ¶ 50 (Austl.). 
43 Clayton, HCA 58 at ¶ 20. 
44 Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30, ¶ 37 (Austl.). 
45 Baker, supra note 18, at 218 n.408. 
46 R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8, ¶ 67 (U.K.). 
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significant Australian authorities involving joint enterprise factual situations 
that all hold that the mental element in complicity is intention.47 The general 
principle announced in these cases is taken from the poaching cases referred 
to in R v Jogee.48 
The law in Australia before McAuliffe is summarised in a passage 
from R v Surridge: 
Thus, if two persons agree that one of them shall kill or 
inflict grievous bodily harm on another party whilst the other 
stands by and keeps watch or otherwise assists, the latter is 
guilty of murder as an accomplice if the third party is killed, 
since he is a principal in the second degree. Again, if they 
agree that the active party shall commit a crime, and agree 
also, expressly or tacitly, that if resistance is offered any 
necessary violence may be used to overcome it, including 
killing or inflicting grievous bodily harm, then if the active 
party intentionally kills or inflicts grievous bodily harm 
which causes death, in order to overcome resistance, the 
other party is guilty of murder, because the killing was within 
the common purpose. If the killing amounted only to 
manslaughter by the active party, the other party is also guilty 
only of manslaughter. 49 
These cases adopt the general principle that can be traced right back 
to Lord Dacre’s Case,50 although there have been aberrant decisions over 
the centuries. Unquestionably, the natural, probable consequence doctrine 
and the foresight of possibility doctrine have both been used as substitutes 
for a doctrine of intention in some cases over the centuries, 51  but the 
scholarly research demonstrates that the bulk of cases require intention.52 
This also is buttressed by the supporting arguments, principles, and 
precedents quoted in the dissenting judgments of Justice Kirby in Clayton v 
                                                        
47 R v Johns (1978) 1 NSWLR 284, 285–86 (Austl.); R v Doorey (1970) 3 NSWLR 
351, 353 (Austl.); R v Dunn (1930) 30 SR (NSW) 210, 214 (Austl.); R v Kalinowski  
(1930) 31 SR (NSW) 377, 380–81 (Austl.); R v Surridge (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 278, 
282–83 (Austl.); R v Adams [1932] VLR 222, 223–24 (Austl.); R v Grand (1903) 3 SR  
(NSW) 216, 218 (Austl.); R v Dowdle (1900) 26 VLR 637, 639–41 (Austl.).  
48 Jogee, UKSC 8 at ¶ 23. 
49 R v Surridge (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 278, 282–83 (Austl.). 
50 Le Seignior Dacres’ Case, [1535] 72 Eng. Rep. 458. 
51 Jogee, UKSC 8 at ¶ 20 (U.K.). 
52 BAKER, supra note 3, ch 2. 
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The Queen53 and Justice Gageler J in Miller. However, ever since McAuliffe, 
the Australian law followed the Chan Wing-Siu approach, which has now 
been reconfirmed in Miller. Yet the majority in Miller54 misquoted Foster by 
failing to quote in full the passages from Foster, so the meaning and context 
of what was being asserted was lost. Foster stated: 
If the principal totally and substantially varieth, if being 
solicited to commit a felony of one kind he wilfully and 
knowingly committeth a felony of another, he will stand 
single in that Offence, and the person soliciting will not be 
involved in his guilt. 
. . . 
But if the principal in substance complieth with the 
temptation, varying only in circumstance of time or place, or 
in the manner of execution, in these cases the person 
soliciting to the offence will, if absent, be an accessary before 
the fact, if present a principal. For the substantial, the 
criminal part of the temptation, be it advice, command, or 
hire, is complied with. A. commandeth B. to murder C. by 
poison, B. doth it by sword, or other weapon, or by any other 
means. A. is accessary to this murder: for the murder of C, 
was the object principally in his contemplation, and that is 
effected. 
. . . 
So where the principal goeth beyond the terms of the 
solicitation, if in the event the felony committed was a 
probable consequence of what was ordered or advised, the 
person giving such orders or advice will be an accessary to 
that felony. A., upon some affront given by B., ordereth his 
servant to way-lay him and give him a sound beating; the 
servant doth so, and B. dieth of this beating. A. is accessary 
to this murder. 55 
                                                        
53 Clayton v The Queen [2006] HCA 58, ¶¶ 31–33 (Austl.). 
54 The majority in Miller v The Queen referenced the use of the “natural probable 
consequence” maxim out of the context in which Foster discussed and applied it. 
Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30, ¶ 6 (Austl.). The majority in R v Jogee also quote 
the wrong passages from Foster, but seem not to confuse the evidential maxim from 
the substantive fault element. Jogee, UKSC 8 at ¶ 20–21 (U.K.). 
55 MICHAEL FOSTER, A REPORT OF SOME PROCEEDINGS ON THE COMMISSION FOR THE  
TRIAL OF THE REBELS IN THE YEAR 1746, IN THE COUNTY SURRY; AND OF OTHER  
CROWN CASES: TO WHICH ARE ADDED DISCOURSES UPON A FEW BRANCHES OF THE  
CROWN LAW 369–70 (3d ed., 1809). 
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Thereafter, Foster referred to what would now be conceptualised as a 
conditional intention case and an oblique intention case. 56  When these 
passages are read in full, it is plain for all to see that they do not adopt 
objective fault as the substantive fault element. The facts in these cases refer 
to direct instigation, where the accessory directly or obliquely intends the 
end crime, and therefore it is irrelevant whether different means are used by 
the perpetrator to achieve that intended end.57  These cases also refer to 
unintended consequences (consequences that are unintended but which 
might be said to be a natural probable consequence) flowing from acts that 
the defendant intended to encourage the plaintiff to perpetrate. Foster stated 
that it is no defense for the defendant to assert that he or she only intended 
the plaintiff to inflict great bodily harm, if that harm causes the victim’s 
death—since a natural probable consequence of great bodily harm could be 
death. The probability of death being caused by such is debatable, but that is 
beside the point, since this is no more than an early maxim for inferring fault 
and equally an early attempt to justify constructive liability for both the 
accessory and perpetrator.  None of these cases refer to joint enterprise 
liability. Foster’s view on joint enterprises was stated in the Three Soldiers 
case.58 The Three Soldiers case required a common intention with respect to 
any collateral crime and, like Lord Dacre’s Case59 and the later poaching 
cases from the 1800s onwards,60 which are accepted as authoritative in R v 
Jogee, it developed and set the fault element for complicity. 
However, the majority decision in Miller does not accept either of 
these propositions.61 That decision holds that fault can be established in 
complicity cases if the accessory’s state of mind involved either intentional 
association, assistance, or encouragement or reckless association, assistance, 
                                                        
56 Id. at 370. Foster provides examples of a conditional intention, stating, “A. adviseth 
B. to rob C., He doth rob him, and in so doing, either upon resistance made, or to 
conceal the fact, or upon any other motive operating at the time of the robbery, killeth 
him. A. is [an] accessary to this murder.”  Foster provides an example of an oblique 
intention, stating, “A. soliciteth B. to burn the house of C., he doth it; and the flames 
taking hold of the house of D. that likewise is burnt. A. is [an] accessary to the burning 
of this latter house.” Id. 
57 BAKER, supra note 3, at 226–39. 
58 FOSTER, supra note 55, at 353 (describing the facts surrounding The Three Soldiers  
Case).  
59 Le Seignior Dacres’ Case, [1535] 72 Eng. Rep. 458. 
60 See BAKER, supra note 3, at 79, 106 (analyzing the poaching cases in Australian 
law); see also R v Dunn (1930) 30 SR (NSW) 210, 214 (Austl.).  
61 See generally Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30 (Austl.). 
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or encouragement.62 The majority in Miller misquote Stephen by giving a 
selection of quotes from Stephen out of context and in isolation from his 
views on joint enterprise. 63  If they had quoted the Article immediately 
below the one quoted from Stephen’s Digest of the Criminal Law, the entire 
meaning of Stephen’s statement in that Article would have been apparent. 
Stephen did not adopt an objective fault element for complicity in his 
own books. 64  The quotations referred to in Miller were discussing 
accessorial liability in cases where the perpetrator was constructively liable 
for an unintended consequence of an intended act. 65  Beyond that, the 
quotations in Miller simply reiterate the statement of the law from Foster, 
which was that it is no defence to accessorial murder that the perpetrator 
used different means from what the accessory intended to be used.66 Foster, 
on the very next page of the decision, continues his analysis with reference 
to transferred malice and the famous case of Archer and Saunders.67 But 
Stephen’s views about joint enterprise liability are not in the passages 
quoted by the High Court. Instead, Stephen quotes the Three Soldiers case 
and R v Plummer 68  under a different Article in his digest concerning 
common purpose fact scenarios.69 
However, the majority in R v. Jogee removed the need for further 
discussion, as that decision noted that the objective test has not been a part 
of the common law for 300 years, if it ever was. Consequently, it is hard to 
see how that test has any relevance on the current law. Justice Gageler got 
the gist of this when he stated: 
[t]he common law for a long time treated intention as a 
matter for objective determination: a party was taken to 
intend a probable consequence of an act which that party did 
or to which that party agreed. Early commentaries on 
criminal liability at common law, particularly those of Sir 
Michael Foster in the middle of the eighteenth century and 
                                                        
62 Id. at ¶ 84. 
63 Id. at ¶ 13–16. 
64 BAKER, supra note 3, at 235.  
65 Miller, HCA 30 at ¶ 12. 
66 Id. 
67 FOSTER, supra note 55, at 353. 
68 R v Plummer, [1706] 84 Eng. Rep. 1103. 
69 BAKER, supra note 3, at 48–49.  
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Sir James Stephen in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, need to be read cautiously in that light.70 
B. The Court’s Reasons Why Extended Joint Enterprise Should be 
Retained 
The most controversial theory to justify a doctrine of extended joint 
enterprise invoked in Miller 71  is Professor A. P. Simester’s “change of 
normative position” theory, presented in a 2006 paper.72  According to the 
change of normative position theory, a participant who voluntarily and 
intentionally joins a criminal enterprise has changed his normative position 
and therefore should be made fully liable for any collateral crime he foresaw 
as a possibility. 
However, such an explanation overlooks the difference between 
individual perpetration liability and extended joint enterprise complicity 
liability. In an individual perpetration liability situation, such as assault 
occasioning actual bodily harm, it is the defendant’s own act which results 
in the unintended harm. However, in the context of extended joint enterprise 
liability, it is another autonomous and independent human being’s act (the 
perpetrator’s act) that results in the unintended harm proscribed in the 
collateral crime. A person who assaults his victim and then causes 
unintended harm has control, at least, over his own conduct that has caused 
the unintended harm. But a participant in an extended joint criminal 
enterprise case has no control over the perpetrator’s independent conduct 
that caused the unintended harm. The participant merely has assisted or 
encouraged the perpetrator to do the underlying crime, but he has no control 
over whether the perpetrator will commit other collateral crimes. 
The change of normative position theory faces strong challenges in 
trying to justify constructive liability in the context of perpetration liability.  
First of all, it is unclear what kind of normative position it is to be changed 
by committing a crime. Secondly, it is ambiguous how the position is 
changed. Some scholars observe that the intentionality of the defendant must 
lead to the changes in the normative position of the perpetrator.73 However, 
                                                        
70 Miller, HCA 30 at ¶ 84 (Justice Gageler dissenting). 
71 Id. at ¶ 33. The alternative view, proposed by Professor Simester, is that joint  
criminal enterprise is a sui generis form of secondary participation in a crime and not  
merely a sub-species of accessorial liability. See generally Simester, supra note 10. 
72 See generally Simester, supra note 10.   
73 Andrew Ashworth, A Change of Normative Position: Determining the Contours of  
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based on the notion of intentionality, the theory encounters problems when 
applied “to impulsive conduct or acts done in temper.” 74  Even if its 
inapplicability in such cases is ignored, the advocators of this theory do not 
clearly state how the normative position has been changed in other 
circumstances, because an intention to commit a specific crime does not 
indicate an intention to bring any harm of any description. There is a big 
moral difference between a person facing the consequences of his own 
personal acts and facing the consequences of the autonomous and 
independent conduct of another.75 
The change of normative position theory cannot provide a 
convincing justification for constructive liability in the context of individual 
perpetration liability; it can do this no better in the context of extended joint 
criminal enterprise liability, where the defendant will be held liable for the 
conduct of the independent and autonomous perpetrator over which the 
defendant has no control at all. Professor John Gardner, the original author 
of the change of normative position theory, has not only abandoned his 
original assertions on the theory but has also repudiated any suggestion that 
his aim was to present a positive justification for constructive liability. 
Gardner writes: 
I suggested a possible way of thinking about constructive 
crimes. I said that by committing the lesser crime one 
“changes one’s normative position” such that a certain 
outcome that would not otherwise have counted . . . now 
counts against one, and adds to one’s crime. . . . I regret that 
my remark about “changing one’s normative position” was 
taken . . . to be an attempt at offering a “substantive moral 
justification for any constructive criminal liability. . . . I only 
meant to analyse the law’s own moral outlook. I meant . . . to 
set out the thing that needs to be justified rather than the 
justification.76 
                                                                                                                                      
Culpability in Criminal Law, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 232, 243 (2008); Jeremy Horder,  
A Critique of the Correspondence Principle in Criminal Law, 1995 CRIM. L. REV. 759, 
763–65 (1995). 
74 Ashworth, supra note 73, at 244. 
75 See BAKER, supra note 3, at 82.  
76 JOHN GARDNER, OFFENCES AND DEFENCES 246–47 (2007). 
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Simester and others77 have seized Gardner’s analysis of the law’s 
moral outlook concerning constructive liability as a substantive justification 
for not only permitting constructive liability, but also for dispensing with the 
conduct element in complicity, which should be either assistance or 
encouragement. The only check such a position puts on liability by mere 
association is foresight. Hence, association plus foresight is sufficient to 
convict a person of murder in Australia. 78  These scholars have 
misunderstood Gardner and have put forward a vacuous assertion as a 
positive justification for the extended joint enterprise doctrine. This Article 
submits that the arguments by Baker and also more generally by Gardner79 
and Professor Andrew Ashworth80 are far more convincing. It is difficult to 
see how the normative position explanation can provide a substantive 
justification for the unjust form of criminalization that this extended 
doctrine of joint enterprise liability permits. 
In addition to using the unsound justification of change of normative 
position theory, the majority judge in Miller gives conservative policy 
reasons for not adopting the legal interpretation of the law as presented by 
the Supreme Court in R v Jogee.81 In that case, the law was interpreted by 
drawing on the existing precedents, not policy opinions that are not 
underwritten with solid empirical research.82 The lack of empirical research 
to support these bold policy claims is just one reason that those policy 
justifications should not have been invoked to interpret the law. In extreme 
cases, policy might compel a court to reduce the scope of the criminal law, 
but it should never give a court permission to extend the criminal law. It is 
an ancient common law principle that doubtful law be interpreted in favour 
of the defendant. Moreover, neither precedent nor policy empowers a court 
to create new common law doctrines of criminal liability.83 
                                                        
77 Horder & Hughes, supra note 10, at 398. 
78 It has been suggested that joint enterprise liability “allows a form of ‘guilt by  
association’ or ‘guilt by simple presence without more.’ Nothing in McAuliffe supports 
either conclusion . . . the secondary party must continue to participate in the agreed 
criminal enterprise.” Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30, ¶ 45 (Austl.). 
79 GARDNER, supra note 63.   
80 Ashworth, supra note 73. 
81 Miller, HCA 30 at ¶ 145–47 
82 Id. 
83 R v Rimmington [2006] 1 AC 459 (U.K.). It is an “ancient principle that in case of  
doubt a criminal statute is to be “strictly construed” in favour of the defendant.” ALAN  
NORRIE, CRIME, REASON AND HISTORY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL LAW 
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The majority judgment in Miller adopted the policy considerations in 
R v Powell,84 asserting that the goal of crime control provides good reasons 
for maintaining the doctrine of extended joint enterprise. 85  However, 
adopting the extended joint enterprise doctrine produces extreme injustice 
and unfairness, as a defendant would be labelled and punished in the same 
way as the perpetrator when the defendant’s wrongdoing should be labelled 
and punished as a distinct crime. Under the extended joint enterprise 
doctrine, such a person would not be deterred from killing because he did 
not perpetrate the actus reus of the collateral crime. 86  Punishing a 
participant in a joint enterprise for any collateral crime he foresaw as a 
possibility may serve the purpose of general deterrence if it gives the 
general public a signal that joining a criminal joint enterprise is something 
they should avoid. But such a deterrence goal is already targeted by 
punishing the defendant for participating in the underlying crime. 
The policy arguments in Miller, which were given by the High Court 
to defend its decision not to reinterpret the law to reconcile it with centuries 
of common law authorities and contemporary standards of justice, show that 
The High Court misunderstood its role. The High Court is not a legislature, 
and therefore its role is not to look at the wider policy arguments that might 
justify legislative reform. Rather its job is to interpret the specific legal 
doctrines before it by drawing on precedents. For an example of one of its 
wide policy justifications, The High Court stated: 
Importantly, in Clayton it was said that no change should be 
undertaken to the law of extended joint criminal enterprise 
without examining the whole of the law with respect to 
secondary liability for crime. As was observed, it would be 
undesirable to alter the doctrine as it applies to the law of 
homicide, which is its principal area of application, without 
consideration of whether the common law of murder should 
be amended to distinguish between killing with intent to kill 
and killing with intent to cause really serious injury.87 
                                                                                                                                      
14 (2014). 
84 R v Powell [1999] 1 AC 1, 19–20 (HL) (U.K.).  
85 Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30, ¶ 145 (Austl.). 
86 See generally PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW:  
WHO SHOULD BE PUNISHED HOW MUCH (2008).   
87 Miller, HCA 30 at ¶ 40. 
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This statement is followed by three more paragraphs stating that the 
entire law would have to be considered and that changes in the law should 
not be made without reforming the entire law of complicity.88 It refers to the 
sort of policy and big picture arguments that are in the remit of law 
commissions and parliaments. Some of the other policy “assertions” stated 
in Miller for not overruling McAuliffe included that it would cause great 
inconvenience, since many wrongly convicted parties might appeal, and 
there wasn’t any substantive injustice in the current law.89 These sorts of 
wider policy considerations are not the business of the courts. “Judges ought 
to remember that their office is jus dicere, and not jus dare; to interpret law, 
and not to make law, or give law.”90 
The High Court was not bound to follow the Supreme Court and 
Privy Council decisions in R v Jogee and Ruddock, but those decisions 
should have been much more persuasive than they were. This is especially 
true, considering the compelling academic research on the point and taking 
into account that the Supreme Court of the United States recently noted how 
the early English authorities mandated that the mens rea for complicity 
liability is intention.91 It is also incongruous that The High Court instead 
decided to apply the decision in R v Powell, which was overruled for being 
an erroneous decision.92 Not only did The High Court pay no attention to the 
common law as it existed before Chan Wing-Siu, it also relied on a very 
narrow selection of academic works and terse case commentaries.93 Perhaps 
the most controversial argument invoked was Simester’s “change of 
normative position” theory.94 Justice Keane was also in the majority but 
gave a separate judgment, the controversial and flawed reasoning of which 
will be discussed in the next section of this article. 
The High Court failed to provide a precedential justification, let 
alone a positive normative justification, for its extension of the criminal law 
in Miller. Specifically, it did not provide a justification that is supported by 
                                                        
88 Id. at ¶ 41 – 43. 
89 Id. “The submissions are in abstract form and do not identify decided cases in which 
it can be seen that extended joint criminal enterprise liability has occasioned injustice.” 
Id. at ¶ 39.  
90 FRANCIS BACON, ESSAYS: MORAL, ECONOMICAL, AND POLITICAL 251 (1798).  
91 See Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1255 (2014).  
92 Miller, HCA 30 at ¶ 40. “Moreover, most of the arguments in favour of change had  
been thoroughly considered and rejected by the House of Lords in Powell.” Id. 
93 Id. at ¶ 132–34. 
94 Id. at ¶ 131. 
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the common law precedents or by any other principles of justice. In the 
older Australian authorities, there is no precedent that replaces the assistance 
and encouragement requirement for complicity liability with a conduct 
element that requires nothing more than association. 95  These same 
authorities also support interpreting the mental element in complicity as 
limiting liability to intentional assistance and encouragement.96 The High 
Court invoked the change of normative position theory to defend a doctrine 
of extended joint enterprise that it acknowledged was created by judicial fiat 
in 1995.97 Consequently, the High Court should have developed a positive 
normative or precedential justification to show the validity and justice of 
adopting this approach. 
The interpretative methodology adopted by The High Court in Miller 
was unorthodox. In the 21st century, it is unexpected that Supreme Court 
decisions from the United Kingdom and the United States, drawing on 
centuries of common law precedents, are given no persuasive influence. The 
appeal was from the common law jurisdiction of South Australia.98 South 
Australia is a common law jurisdiction where, until 1986, an appeal could 
be made to the Privy Council.99  When appeals were made to the Privy 
Council, the Board of the Council drew on the English common law 
authorities to resolve legal issues. There have been no appeals to the Privy 
Council from Australia since 1980 and the expense of appealing to London 
has been such a deterrent that there have not been any criminal law appeals 
since the 1964 appeal in Parker v The Queen. 
Nevertheless, Parker used the common law method of drawing on 
English precedents to contextualise and historicize the law as a part of the 
                                                        
95 See generally R v Johns (1978) 1 NSWLR 284 (Austl.); R v Doorey (1970) 3  
NSWLR 351 (Austl.); R v Surridge (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 278 (Austl.); R v Dunn  
(1930) 30 SR (NSW) 210 (Austl.); R v Kalinowski (1930) 31 SR (NSW) 377 (Austl.);  
R v Grand (1903) 3 SR (NSW) 216 (Austl.); R v Adams [1932] VLR 222 (Austl.); R v  
Dowdle (1900) 26 VLR 637 (Austl.).  
96 See generally BAKER, supra note 3. 
97 See, e.g., McAuliffe v The Queen (1995) 183 ALJR 621 (Austl.). 
98 See generally KENNETH J ARENSON ET AL., AUSTRALIAN CRIMINAL LAW IN THE  
COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed., 2014). 
99 The Privy Council (Appeals from the High Court) Act 1975 (Cth) (Austl.). The act 
abolished the right to appeal from the High Court to the Privy Council in all matters of  
state jurisdiction, but it remained possible for appellants to choose between appealing  
to the High Court or the Privy Council on state matters until 1986. Australia Act 1986  
(Cth) s 11 (Austl.). 
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interpretive approach.100  In that case the Privy Council drew on ancient 
English authorities to build a narrative for interpreting the law within the 
common law context in which it evolved.101  Moreover, this Article has 
submitted that many watertight authorities from Australia’s common law 
jurisdictions convincingly underwrite the reasoning adopted by the 
majorities in R v Jogee and Ruddock.102 The same precedents convincingly 
undermine the majority decision of The High Court in Miller. 
II. PERPETRATION VS. ASSISTING OR ENCOURAGING 
In Miller, Justice Keane starts his separate judgment by suggesting 
that intention is required for standard complicity and that “the criminal 
responsibility of a participant in a joint criminal enterprise is grounded in 
the authorisation of a crime which is incidental to the enterprise.”103 But 
Justice Keane does not explain how one can recklessly authorize. One 
cannot accidentally, negligently, or recklessly authorize, even if one might 
negligently or recklessly send a message of encouragement. Authorization 
has to be intentional. If you authorize something then the concept of 
“authorize” suggests a desire or purpose that it happen.104 To authorize is to 
approve or permit, suggesting that the defendant gives his permission—this 
the defendant cannot do accidentally or recklessly, since that would not be 
any permission at all. It would be a putative permission based on the 
perpetrator’s mistaken belief that the defendant is genuinely authorizing or 
permitting the perpetrator’s action. Justice Keane then asserts that 
Australian law recognises that criminal liability should be proportionate to 
individual culpability, but that this can be achieved by making a person who 
recklessly associates with a murderer liable for a murder perpetrated by that 
murderer: 
In particular, where two or more persons agree to commit a 
crime together knowing that its execution includes the risk of 
the commission of another crime in the course of its 
                                                        
100 Parker v The Queen (1964) 111 CLR 665, ¶ 43–45 (Austl.). 
101 Id. at ¶ 46. 
102 See generally R v Doorey (1970) 3 NSWLR 351 (Austl.); R v Surridge (1942) 42  
SR (NSW) 278 (Austl.); R v Dunn (1930) 30 SR (NSW) 210 (Austl.); R v Kalinowski  
(1930) 31 SR (NSW) 377 (Austl.); R v Grand (1903) 3 SR (NSW) 216 (Austl.); R v  
Adams [1932] VLR 222 (Austl.); R v Dowdle (1900) 26 VLR 637 (Austl.).  
103 Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30, ¶ 136 (Austl.). 
104 BAKER, supra note 3.  
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execution, there is no obvious reason, in terms of individual 
moral culpability, why the person who commits the actus 
reus should bear primary criminal responsibility, as between 
himself or herself and the other participants to the joint 
criminal enterprise, for the incidental crime. Because of the 
fact of the agreement to carry out jointly the criminal 
enterprise, the person who commits the actus reus of the 
incidental crime is necessarily acting as the instrument of the 
other participants to deal with the foreseen exigencies of 
carrying their enterprise into effect.105 
Justice Keane then goes on to expound some sort of agency theory: 
Where parties commit to a joint criminal enterprise, each 
participant becomes, by reason of that commitment, both the 
principal and the agent of the other participants: for the 
purposes of that enterprise they are partners in crime. Each 
participant also necessarily authorises those acts which he or 
she foresees as possible incidents of carrying out the 
enterprise in which he or she has agreed, and continues, to 
participate.106 
It seems that Justice Keane was confused about the difference 
between moral culpability and legal culpability and the difference between 
perpetration and assistance or encouragement. He also seems to conflate 
joint perpetration with assistance or encouragement.107  Moreover, Justice 
Keane seems to misunderstand the difference between innocent agency and 
perpetration.108 Those who participate in criminal joint enterprises are not 
mere instruments in the hands of each other—they are not innocent agents 
but fully autonomous wrongdoers. They are self-governing and self-
determining agents. Liberal states do not adhere to the notion of collective 
agency. 109 Justice Keane’s reference to organised crime is also unhelpful, as 
it involves many conceptual aspects and distinctions that make it very 
different from standard complicity. Most jurisdictions have enacted special 
                                                        
105 Miller, HCA 30 at ¶ 138.   
106 Id. at ¶ 139. 
107 Id. at ¶ 135–42.   
108 Justice Keane relies on agency or vicarious liability theory and fails to see how it 
differs from complicity liability. Miller, HCA 30 at ¶ 140–41. 
109 George P. Fletcher, Collective Guilt and Collective Punishment, 5 THEORETICAL  
INQUIRIES L. 163, 168 (2004); Jeff McMahan, Collective Crime and Collective  
Punishment, 27 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 4, 5 (2008). 
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provisions to tackle organized crime,110 and it is unhelpful to discuss it in 
the context of complicity; such a discussion is not relevant or helpful for 
interpreting the law of complicity, because it is a conceptually distinct form 
of wrongdoing. 
By and large joint enterprises do not involve organised crime, but 
usually involve a couple of criminals engaging in a robbery or even some 
lawful activity. There are a couple of high profile cases involving gangs of 
youths where an escalation of violence has resulted in a murder by one of 
the gang, but such cases are not the norm.  
In the earlier High Court case of Miller v The Queen,111 D drove P to 
locations, such as parks, so he could have sexual relations with prostitutes. P 
started to kill the prostitutes and D with this knowledge continued to assist 
him by driving him to the locations. D knew that P had started to randomly 
kill some of the women, but continued to help.  In this case, P was hardly an 
instrument of D, nor was D a joint perpetrator. The enterprise was lawful 
since it involved consensual sexual relations between two adults.  P did not 
intend to kill on many occasions, but merely intended to have consensual 
sex. It could be inferred that D conditionally intended to assist P to kill 
whenever the compulsion struck P, since D had full knowledge of what was 
taking place but chose to continue to assist.112 To argue that P was merely 
D’s instrument in such case is erroneous. 113 
An accessory is deemed equally liable as a principal when the 
perpetrator intended to kill (or perpetrate whatever crime was committed) 
using his own hands, while the accessory did not intend to kill and did not in 
fact cause the death, but merely intended that the perpetrator intentionally 
kill (or in Australia was reckless as to whether the perpetrator might kill) 
and intentionally assisted or encouraged the perpetrator. The law deems that 
the defendant intended to kill and that he killed with his own hands; it is on 
that fiction that he is held equally liable for the crime committed by the 
actual perpetrator. These deeming provisions are based on a legal fiction 
that the defendant personally killed and personally intended to kill, when 
                                                        
110 Liz Campbell, The Offence of Participating in Activities of Organised Crime  
Group: Section 45 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, 10 ARCHBOLD REV. 6, 6 (2015);  
Anna Sergi, Organised Crime in Criminal Law: Conspiracy and Membership Offences  
in Italian, English and International Frameworks, 25 KING’S L.J. 185, 185 (2014). 
111 Miller v The Queen (1980) 32 ALR 321, 325–26 (Austl.). 
112 See supra Baker, note 3.  
113 Miller, 32 ALR at 321. 
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that is not the case. Justice Keane seems to assert that this means no moral 
distinction should be drawn between the parties to a crime. For Justice 
Keane, they should all be deemed principals at all stages of the inquiry. 
A.  Assisting or Encouraging does not Cause the Prohibited Harm in the 
Target Crime 
 Justice Keane’s interpretation, however, is not true. A person who 
assists or encourages the commission of a crime is an assister or encourager 
of that the crime, not a perpetrator of that crime. This begs the question, why 
is participation different from perpetration? The core difference between 
participation and perpetration is that the latter causes the prohibited criminal 
harm while the former merely contributes to the prohibited harm by 
assisting or encouraging the independent and autonomous perpetrator. The 
accessory is one step removed from the prohibited harm, and the 
perpetrator’s free, deliberate, and autonomous perpetration has broken any 
chain of causation between the accessory and the prohibited harm. The 
canonical statement of the difference between perpetration and participation 
is provided by Professor Glanville Williams. Williams states: 
[t]he novus actus doctrine is at the root of the law of 
complicity . . ..Principals cause, accomplices encourage (or 
otherwise influence) or help. If the instigator were regarded 
as causing the result he would be a principal, and the 
conceptual division between principals (or, as I prefer to call 
them, perpetrators) and accessories would vanish. Indeed, it 
was because the instigator was not regarded as causing the 
crime that the notion of accessories had to be developed. This 
is the irrefragable argument for recognising the novus actus 
principle as one of the bases of our criminal law.114 
The House of Lords in the leading case R v Kennedy (No.2) held: 
[t]he criminal law generally assumes the existence of free 
will . . .. But, generally speaking, informed adults of sound 
mind are treated as autonomous beings able to make their 
own decisions how they will act . . .. Thus D is not to be 
treated as causing V to act in a certain way if V makes a 
                                                        
114 Williams, supra note 15, at 398. 
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voluntary and informed decision to act in that way rather than 
another. 115 
Hart and Honoré also came to a similar conclusion in their famous 
treatise on causation.116 The rule that free, voluntary, and informed human 
actions can break the chain of causation has been confirmed as a principle 
that is “fundamental and not controversial.”117  In the context of complicity, 
the perpetrator, and only the perpetrator, directly causes the end criminal 
harm; he causes it directly through his personal actions. Moreover, the free, 
informed, and autonomous action theory deals with fully culpable agents, 
isolating them from the special case of innocent agents. The assister’s (or 
encourager’s) action is in the background and has no direct influence on the 
end criminal harm—the criminal harm is contingent on the perpetrator’s 
choice to use the assistance supplied or to listen to the encouragement that is 
proffered. 
To illustrate: the defendant supplies the perpetrator with bullets and 
the perpetrator puts these in his gun and uses these particular bullets to kill 
the victim.118 The defendant has assisted the perpetrator, but the defendant 
has not caused the perpetrator to load the gun and kill the victim.119 The 
perpetrator has caused himself to be armed and caused himself to aim at the 
human target and pull the trigger.120 Provided the perpetrator was not insane 
or under duress or deception, he or she made a fully informed and 
autonomous choice to kill another human being, independent of the 
defendant’s actions. 
           According to Gardner, “there is no way of contributing to any result, 
directly or indirectly, except causally. That is the only kind of contribution 
to results that exists, and since the only kind of complicity is complicity by 
contribution to results, complicity is always a kind of causal wrong.”121  
                                                        
115 R v Kennedy (No.2) [2008] 1 A.C. 269 ¶ 14 (U.K.).   
116 Hart and Honoré wrote: “The free, deliberate and informed intervention of a second  
person, who intends to exploit the situation created by the first, but is not acting in  
concert with him, is normally held to relieve the first actor of criminal responsibility.”   
H. L. A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 326 (2d ed., 2002) (footnote 
omitted).  
117 See e.g., R v Gnango [2012] 1 AC 827 ¶ 131 (U.K.); Kennedy (No.2), [2008] 1 AC 
at ¶ 14. 
118 BAKER, supra note 3, 260–61. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Gardner, supra note 14, at 443. 
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Gardner argues that accessories cause through the conduct of the 
perpetrator, 122  but what Gardner seems to call indirect causation cannot 
really be conceptualised as causation. People who have argued that 
accessories can “cause” use a word “in a special or technical sense that need 
not conform to our ordinary use of the word, while still trading on what we 
normally mean by it.” 123  Causation, as used by Gardner in analyzing 
complicity liability, is not the central type of causal relationship referred to 
in perpetration liability; instead, it is understood in a more tenuous sense.124 
Professor Michael Moore also argues that an intervening act does not 
actually break the chain of causation, but it is construed to be so because 
some reasons of legal policy make it justified that an intervening act does 
break the chain of causation. 125 Professor G.R. Sullivan holds a very similar 
viewpoint to that of Moore. 126  But this argument is unconvincing and 
indefensible as long as perpetration liability is still the core of criminal 
liability. It has long been recognized that one’s conduct is deemed to be an 
autonomous and free choice if it is not done under deception or coercion.127 
Free, voluntary human actions cannot be caused, even if it could be said in a 
sense to be heavily influenced by another,128  because human beings are 
totally sovereign over their own actions and human actions are treated 
differently from natural events.129 
It is the thrust of this Article that causation rules are understood as 
they currently stand in the paradigm criminal liability form, which is 
perpetration liability; and causation’s two prongs in that form are but-for 
cause and legal cause. Therefore, the one who has caused the prohibited 
harm in the crime is in fact the perpetrator rather than the assister or 
encourager, if the two prongs of causation rules are applied. Assistance or 
                                                        
122 Id. 
123 Daniel Yeager, Helping, Doing, and the Grammar of Complicity, 15 CRIM. JUST.  
ETHICS 25, 29 (1996).  
124 Hart and Honoré, supra note 120, at 43. 
125 MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW,  
MORALS, AND METAPHYSICS 291–92 (2009).  
126 G. R. Sullivan, Doing Without Complicity, 4 J. COMMONWEALTH CRIM. L. 199, 221 
(2012).  
127 See e.g., R v Gnango [2012] 1 AC 827 ¶ 131 (U.K.); R v Kennedy (No.2) [2008] 1  
AC 269, ¶ 14 (U.K.); R v Latif [1996] 1 WLR 104 ¶ 61 (U.K.).  
128 Williams, supra note 15, at 392.   
129  Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of  
Doctrine, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 330 (1985). 
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encouragement in many cases will not be the but-for cause of the prohibited 
harm in the target crime,130 let alone the legal cause of that harm. This is 
because, in many cases, the perpetrator would commit the target crime 
anyway, even if he did not get assistance or encouragement from the 
accessory. In some cases, the assistance or encouragement is essential and 
indispensable. For example, “the brilliant scientist . . . [D] purposely 
provides . . . [P] with the means to blow up the city of Los Angeles, which 
outcome would have been well beyond . . . [P’s or any ordinary person’s] 
expertise or capacity . . . [but for D’s] assistance.”131 It is plausible to say 
that, but for the accessory’s help, the perpetrator would not have committed 
the crime as he did. However, it would be problematic to say that the 
defendant’s assistance is the legal cause of the eventual harm, because the 
perpetrator’s bombing of the city is a free, voluntary, and informed human 
intervention and can therefore break the chain of causation between the 
defendant’s facilitation and the resulting death. “The reason why complicity 
emerges as a separate ground of liability is that causation doctrine cannot 
generally deal satisfactorily with results that take the form of another 
person’s voluntary action.” 132  If causation is understood as it stands in 
perpetration liability, then there is no causation between an accessory’s 
assisting or encouraging and the prohibited harm in the target crime. 
B. Assisting or Encouraging as a Remote Harm 
Perpetration (depending on the crime) almost always involves direct 
criminal harm-doing. In a case of murder, it involves the victim’s life being 
deprived. In a case of rape, it involves a victim’s sexual autonomy being 
violated. In a case of robbery, it involves a victim suffering injury and losing 
property. However, assisting or encouraging almost never involves any 
direct criminal harm-doing. It is possible to think of examples where the 
encouragement or assistance is criminal in itself,133 but in most cases the 
                                                        
130 Id. at 360. 
131 Joshua Dressler, Reforming Complicity Law: Trivial Assistance as a Lesser  
Offense?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 427, 440 (2008). 
132 Kadish, supra note 133, at 405.  
133 For example, a rapist is encouraged to rape in a gang-rape situation because he sees 
his fellow gang members first raping the victim. Technically, each gang rapist could be  
liable for multiple counts of rape, including his own personal act of rape. Illegal 
assistance might result from running a pirate website such as Putlocker to facilitate  
copyright theft. See also The Fraud Act 2006 c. 35, §§ 6–7 (U.K.).  These wrongs are  
crimes per se and are treated as such.  
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encouragement or assistance is not harmful or criminal. The harmfulness of 
assisting or encouraging is contingent on the perpetrator’s independent and 
autonomous choice to use that assistance or encouragement to perpetrate the 
target crime. 
The defendant’s encouragement or assistance, even when substantial 
and culpable, is less dangerous than perpetration, because it is contingent on 
another person being willing to follow through. No empirical study has ever 
been conducted on cases of inchoate assistance and encouragement, but one 
would suspect there are many cases where assistance or encouragement is 
given without the perpetrator acting on it. If this can be proven empirically, 
then that would be evidence of the fact that harmless conduct (remote 
harms) that are only harmful by slightly increasing the risk of a perpetrator’s 
success are less dangerous and wrongful than acts of direct perpetration. 
This Article’s thesis is buttressed by the remote harms theory as 
sketched above. There are several kinds of situations involving remote 
harms such as abstract endangerment, intervening choices, and accumulative 
harms.134 For present purposes the focus is on the second category of remote 
harm, where the harm occurs when another person’s innocuous conduct 
becomes remotely harmful because it helps another or encourages another to 
commit a crime. The crux of the matter is that the accessory’s participation 
is a remote harm in that its harmfulness and wrongfulness is contingent on 
the perpetrator making an independent choice to commit the target crime. 
The harmfulness of perpetration is certain because it initiates the prohibited 
harm; the harmfulness of participation is not certain in itself, but is 
contingent on the perpetrator’s choice. Therefore, participation is less 
harmful than perpetration. 
Another aspect of this is that remote contributions are far less 
dangerous than direct contributions. As moral agents, people have the 
capacity to choose to violate the law or not.135 The perpetrator is made fully 
liable because he unjustifiably and inexcusably chose to kill the victim or 
chose to perpetrate some other criminal harm. The perpetrator is more 
                                                        
134 See Andrew von Hirsch, Extending the Harm Principle: ‘Remote’ Harms and Fair 
Imputation, in HARM AND CULPABILITY 259, 263–65 (A. P. Simester & A. T. H. Smith 
eds., 2003); Dennis J. Baker, The Moral Limits of Criminalizing Remote Harms, 10 
NEW CRIM. L. REV. 370, 372 (2007).  
135 See LARRY ALEXANDER ET AL., CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL  
LAW 196 (2009).  
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dangerous not only because he has the will to kill, whereas the assister or 
encourager only has the nerve and will to assist or encourage, but also 
because the perpetrator has direct control over the end harm. It is the 
perpetrator who controls and decides whether the end harm will be brought 
about, not the remote harmer (assister or encourager). Accessories have no 
control over whether their assistance will be used or whether their 
encouragement will be adhered to, unless they use duress or fraud, which 
would lead to direct liability through the innocent or semi-innocent agent 
doctrines. 136  The accessory leaves the act in the hands of another 
autonomous agent and is one step removed from the direct control that is 
required to bring about the prohibited harm in the target crime. The 
accessory leaves it all to chance. Accessories have only increased the risk 
that the target crime might be committed by providing assistance or 
encouragement. The end result is fully dependent on the perpetrator and 
what he decides to do when the moment for perpetration comes. 
People have control over their choices and therefore are subject to 
liability and punishment for the harms they choose to produce.137 A person 
should not be made fully liable for what he cannot control. 138  The law 
should be very hesitant to punish a person for conduct that is not within his 
control. The accessory only controls his act of assisting or encouraging and 
he should be punished for that wrongdoing only. The decision of whether 
the target crime will be committed is in the hands of the perpetrator. The 
                                                        
136 Even these sorts of innocent agency cases can be dealt with through an independent 
offense. The Serious Crime Act 2007 states:  
(1) A person commits an offence if— 
(a) he does an act capable of encouraging or assisting the 
commission of an offence; and 
(b) he intends to encourage or assist its commission. 
(2) But he is not to be taken to have intended to encourage or assist the 
commission of an offence merely because such encouragement or 
assistance was a foreseeable consequence of his act. 
Serious Crime Act 2007, c. 27, § 44(1)(a-b) (U.K.). Section 47 of that same Act states: 
“In proving for the purposes of this section whether an act is one which, if done, would 
amount to the commission of an offence . . . [the defendant’s] state of mind was such 
that, were he to do it, it would be done with that fault.” Id. at § 47(5)(a)(iii) (U.K.). 
137 See DOUGLAS HUSAK, THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS 34  
(2010); MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL  
LAW 211–18 (2012).  
138 See R.A. Duff, Who is Responsible, for What, to Whom?, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
441, 452–54 (2005).  
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assister or encourager has no control over the perpetrator, let alone the 
occurrence of the prohibited harm in the target crime. Furthermore, the 
assister or encourager is likely a person who does not have the fortitude or 
resolve to perpetrate the actus reus of the crime himself. This kind of person 
is not as dangerous as a person who has the fortitude and resolve to directly 
perpetrate the crime. 
There is a moral difference between intending to assist or encourage 
and intending to perpetrate. If a given defendant intends to kill a victim and 
picks up a knife and pushes it through the victim’s heart, that defendant is in 
a very different “state of evilness of mind” (motivation to directly kill a 
human being up front and live) than another defendant who has merely 
supplied the knife intentionally, but is a person who would never himself to 
do the killing, as he does not have the evilness of mind, nerve, or 
psychology to directly kill using his own hands and is only able to intend 
such an act to be done through the autonomous free acts of another. It is 
easier to imagine killing someone than to actually do it. The person who 
merely assisted or encouraged another to kill might be one who could never 
kill if he had to use his own hands to do the dirty work. If not, and he kills, 
then he should be punished for his personal wrongdoing as a murderer. But 
so long as he remains a remote assister or encourager there is no case for 
deeming him a murderer. 
III. REJECTING THE DOCTRINE OF EXTENDED JOINT ENTERPRISE 
Treating an assister or encourager fully liable in the same way as the 
perpetrator for the crime assisted or encouraged goes against the principles 
of fair labelling 139  and proportionate punishment. 140  A person who has 
assisted rape is not a rapist because he does not penetrate the victim, and 
assisting rape is one step removed from the penetration. Therefore, 
punishing an assister of rape the same as the rapist does not reflect the 
nature and degree of the assister’s wrongdoing. 
                                                        
139 Barry Mitchell, Multiple Wrongdoing and Offence Structure: A Plea for  
Consistency and Fair Labelling, 64 MOD. L. REV. 393, 398 (2001). 
140 ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 29 (1993); Andrew von Hirsch,  
Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment, in 16 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW  
OF RESEARCH 55, 69 (Michael Tonry ed., 1992); ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW  
ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING: EXPLORING THE PRINCIPLES 131–32  
(2005); Douglas Husak, Desert, Proportionality, and the Seriousness of Drug Offences  
in FUNDAMENTALS OF SENTENCING THEORY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ANDREW VON  
HIRSCH 187, 189 (Andrew Ashworth & Martin Wasik eds., 1998). 
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The doctrine of extended joint enterprise liability is even worse. It 
makes a defendant fully liable as the perpetrator for the collateral crime, 
when the defendant did not perpetrate, assist or encourage the perpetration, 
or even intend such a crime to be committed. The full criminal liability for 
the collateral crime is based on a legal fiction that, by participating in the 
underlying crime, he has provided assistance or encouragement to the 
collateral crime automatically. The defendant’s participation in the 
underlying crime is regarded as assisting or encouraging the collateral crime 
and this fictitiously constructed assistance or encouragement is then 
construed as sufficient actus reus of the collateral crime. Moreover, the 
defendant’s mere foresight that the collateral crime might be committed is 
construed as an intention to assist or encourage with knowledge of all the 
essential matters of the collateral crime. This fictitiously constructed mens 
rea is further construed as the required mens rea for the collateral crime. 
The defendant is therefore labelled and punished much more than his 
personal harm-doing and personal culpability would warrant. 
Retributive justice and utilitarianism require that the crime label and 
punishment should reflect the defendant’s past harm-doing and personal 
culpability.141 Criminal law has an expressive function,142 communicating 
the society’s disapproval and condemnation of certain conduct to the 
defendant, the victims and their families, legal professionals as well as the 
general public. Therefore, labelling and punishing the defendant in 
accordance with his personal wrong-doing and individual culpability is 
necessary if this communicative function is to be achieved. It matters that 
the defendant is not just convicted and punished but also that he is labelled 
and punished to the degree he deserves. Obedience to and respect of the 
criminal law is better achieved when people accept and approve of the law 
than when they draw only on their own moral convictions. 
                                                        
141 See generally Douglas N. Husak, Retribution in Criminal Theory, 37 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 959 (2000) (analysizing the theory of retribution in the criminal justice system);  
Michael Tonry, Can Twenty-First Century Punishment Policies be Justified in  
Principle?, in RETRIBUTIVISM HAS A PAST: HAS IT A FUTURE? 3 (Michael Tonry ed.,  
2011) (discussing proptionality in the every evolving eyetme of punishment). 
142 Bernard E. Harcourt, Joel Feinberg on Crime and Punishment: Exploring the  
Relationship between The Moral Limits of Criminal Law and The Expressive Function 
of Punishment, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 145, 161 (2001); see generally Douglas Husak, 
The Criminal Law as Last Resort, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 207 (2004) (discussing  
the use of the criminal system as a last resort only after addressing the underlying  
matter that was expressed through the criminal act).  
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Based on the abovementioned analysis, the wrongdoing of assisting 
or encouraging is less than that of perpetrating, so even if the levels of 
culpability for assisting or encouraging and perpetrating are not substantially 
separate (for instance both defendant and perpetrator intend that the victim 
should be killed), the crime label and punishment should still be less for 
assisting or encouraging. Labelling and punishing assisters or encouragers in 
the same way as perpetrators does not reflect their personal wrong-doing, 
which is assisting or encouraging rather than perpetrating, and their 
individual culpability, which is not the same as the mens rea in the target 
crime. 
A person who assisted or encouraged another to murder, for 
example, is not a murderer in fact and therefore should not be labelled and 
punished as a murderer. Additionally, his intention to assist or encourage the 
perpetrator’s commission of murder is not the same as intending to kill or 
cause great bodily harm by his own hands. Labelling and punishing assisters 
or encouragers in the same way as the perpetrator attaches more stigma than 
their wrong-doing deserves. Such unfairness and injustice is aggravated in 
the context of extended joint enterprise liability for a person who, although 
only assisting or encouraging an underlying crime, is made fully liable as a 
perpetrator for the collateral crime, which he did not perpetrate, assist or 
encourage its perpetration, or intend to be committed. Assisting or 
encouraging a crime is less harmful than perpetrating the crime, and risking 
another’s commission of a crime is less than assisting or encouraging the 
commission of that crime; therefore, risking another’s perpetration of an 
offense is far less than perpetrating that offense. 
It is now clear that Lords Steyn and Mustill (in R v Powell) were 
mistaken in thinking they were bound to apply the evidential maxim of 
foresight of possibility as a substantive fault element in complicity (i.e., they 
were mistaken to think that Sir Robin Cooke’s interpretation of the law as 
stated in Chan Wing-Siu was right and that they were bound by it). 
However, the difference between those Lords and the majority in Miller is 
that those Lords were very open about the fact that they thought the law they 
were bound to state was extremely unfair.143 The difference between the 
decision in R v Jogee and the decision in Miller is that R v Jogee interpreted 
the law so that it could be reconciled with centuries of common law 
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precedents. Principles of justice akin to those mentioned by Justice 
Gageler,144 Justice Kirby,145 and, most significantly, by leading academic 
experts also add weight to the case, but the decision in R v Jogee rests 
simply on an application of the historical precedents. It does not rest on 
policy arguments nor judicial activism, 146  but straightforwardly on legal 
interpretation. Similarly, the decision of the Supreme Court of the United 
States in Rosemond v. US draws on centuries of precedents, including the 
English law authorities cited by Justice Learned Hand in United States v. 
Peoni,147 rather than policy arguments to hold that the mental element in 
complicity is intention.148 Policy arguments are the business of parliament, 
not that of judges, who are meant to interpret law according to precedents 
and principles of justice. Peoni itself was argued as a natural probable 
consequence case, but Justice Learned Hand, tracing the law back as far as 
Bracton, held that the mental element in complicity is intention. 149  The 
Supreme Court of the United States, in Rosemond, held that Learned Hand’s 
statement of the law was correct and applied it.150 Moreover, a number of 
the world’s leading criminal law experts have argued that the precedents 
require intention.151  If anything, the decision in Miller helps to highlight 
injustices and the urgent need for law reform in Australia. 
                                                        
144 Justice Gageler stated:  
To hold a secondary party liable for a crime committed by a 
primary party which the secondary party foresaw but did not 
intend does not measure up against the informing principle of the 
common law “that there should be a close correlation between 
moral culpability and legal responsibility.” In the language of 
King CJ, who stood against the introduction of the doctrine of 
extended joint criminal enterprise into the common law of 
Australia during the period after Chan Wing-Siu and before 
McAuliffe, the doctrine results in “the unjust conviction of persons 
of crimes of which they could not be said, in any true sense, to be 
guilty.”  
 Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30 ¶ 119 (Austl.) (footnote omitted). 
145 Clayton v The Queen [2006] HCA 58 ¶ 78–80 (Austl.). 
146 Lord Toulson is not one for judicial activism, even when it might bring about a fair  
result. See R (on the application of Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2014] UKSC 38 ¶ 
79 (U.K.). 
147 United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 403 (2d Cir. 1938). 
148 Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1244 (2014). 
149 Peoni, 100 F.2d at 403. 
150 Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1244. 
151 See BAKER, supra note 3; Kadish, supra note 133, at 378–79; Glanville Williams,  
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The fairness and just demand in criminal law also has its bearing in 
U.S. law regarding the natural probable consequence rule, which works in a 
way similar to but stricter than the extended joint enterprise doctrine.  In the 
United States, if labelling and punishing a person for the collateral crime as 
a perpetrator, based on his participation in an underlying crime and his 
foresight of the collateral crime, infringes the requirement of fair labelling 
and proportionate punishment that retributive justice seeks to achieve, then 
labelling and punishing a person as a perpetrator based merely on his 
participation in an underlying crime, with nothing more, should be 
absolutely prohibited.152  The natural and probable consequence rule was 
applied in a time when the death penalty and the felony murder rule were in 
full force and when there were no clear distinctions drawn between 
recklessness, intention, and oblique intention as substantive fault elements. 
The rule is found only in a few jurisdictions and is by and large applied to 
facts where there was intention. Professor Kadish has pointed out the link 
between extended joint enterprise complicity and the felony murder rule: 
It also shares a resemblance to the American felony-murder 
rule, long since abandoned in England, which is a particular 
application of the lesser-crime doctrine to murder: a killing 
committed in the course of a felony (nowadays only certain 
felonies) becomes murder even if, apart from the felony, it 
would be manslaughter or not criminal at all.153 
Such harsh and unjust law should be abolished in the 21st century. 
                                                                                                                                      
Complicity, Purpose and the Draft Code: Part 1, 1990 CRIM. L. REV. 4, 4 (1990);  
Glanville Williams, Complicity, Purpose and the Draft Code: Part 2, 1990 CRIM. L.  
REV. 98, 99 (1990). 
152 It is pleasant to see that the Supreme Court of the United States in Rosemond v. 
United States contends that complicity requires intention. Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 
1244. The footnote 7 of the judgment has left, at least, an opportunity to interpret the 
judgment as rejecting the natural probable consequence rule. Id. at 1248 n.7. Many 
U.S. scholars oppose the natural probable consequence rule, but their arguments focus 
on the mens rea element stating that it goes against the basic requirement of mental 
state in criminal law. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 468 
(6th ed., 2012); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 886–922 (6th ed., 2017); Audrey 
Rodgers, Accomplice Liability for Unintentional Crimes: Remaining within the 
Constraints of Intent, 31 LOY. L.A. L. Rev. 1351, 1360 (1998); Heyman, supra note 8, 
at 402. 
153 Sandford H. Kadish, Criminal Law: Reckless Complicity, 87 J. CRIM. L. &  
CRIMINOLOGY 369, 376 (1997). 
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 In light of the unsound decision in Miller v The Queen, it is hoped 
that the relevant parliaments in Australia will consider wholesale reform. If 
that were to happen, this Article argues that the principled way forward is to 
completely abolish the doctrine of extended joint enterprise and replace it 
with a lesser offense that labels and punishes the defendant according to his 
own harm-doing and personal culpability.  
CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of extended joint enterprise arose from the need to 
make an accessory liable for an unintended crime committed by the 
perpetrator. It was an unreasonable stretch of the law based mainly on policy 
grounds. The new development in the common law world indicates a 
demand for a requirement of intention for complicity liability: a person 
should not be made liable for a crime committed by his confederate if he did 
not intend such a crime to be committed with his assistance or 
encouragement.154 However, the Australian court in Miller refused to follow 
R v Jogee, instead holding that the change of normative position theory and 
the pragmatic policy considerations can fairly justify the doctrine of 
extended joint enterprise. 
Foster and Stephen are misquoted in Miller by the majority 
judgment. The old English law required nothing other than intention for 
complicity liability. Chan Wing-Siu had extended the law unreasonably 
wide, which has now been corrected by the Supreme Court of England and 
Wales in R v Jogee. The court in Miller did not provide valid precedential or 
convincing principle justifications for extended joint enterprise liability. 
The change of normative position theory cannot justify extended 
joint enterprise liability. One’s participation in an underlying crime cannot 
be construed automatically as participation in a collateral crime, let alone 
deemed as the actus reus of the collateral crime; one’s foresight of a 
collateral crime cannot equal an intention to assist or encourage the 
collateral crime, nor can it equal the mens rea of the collateral crime. 
The pragmatic policy grounds used in Miller cannot override the 
requirements of basic criminal law principles such as fair labelling, 
proportionate punishment, and personal culpability. The alleged deterrence 
effect of extended joint enterprise doctrine is not empirically proved. More 
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importantly, courts should not aim to obtain easy prosecution at the cost of 
justice and fairness. Fair and just criminalization serves deterrence purposes 
as well or better. 
The extended joint enterprise doctrine goes against the basic 
requirements of retributive justice. It fails to label and punish the defendant 
for his own personal wrongdoing and individual culpability and therefore 
should be abolished. A person who participated in an underlying crime 
while foreseeing the commission of a collateral crime merely took the risk 
that such a crime might be committed. He is not the perpetrator of that 
crime, nor is he the assister or encourager of that crime. Such risk-taking 
conduct should not be labelled and punished as perpetration of that collateral 
crime. If there is any need to criminalize such risk-taking, it is better done 
with a new, lesser offense.  It is hoped that relevant parliaments in Australia 
will abolish this extremely unfair doctrine and replace it with an offense that 
could fairly represent the defendant’s wrongdoing and personal culpability. 
 
 
 
